/- 

>s  t- c 


PROCEEDINGS 


OF   A 


CONVENTION  OF  DELEGATES, 


FROM  THE  STATES  OF 

MASSACHUSETTS,   CONNECTICUT,    AND   RHODE-ISLAND;    THE   COUNTIES   OP   CHE* 

SHIRE    AND   GRAFTON,     IN     THE     STATE     OP     NEW-HAMPSHIRE ;     AND 

THE   COUNTY   OF   WINDHAM,    IN   THE   STATE   OF   VERMONT;— 


CONVENED   AT   HARTFORD,   IN    THE   STATE   OP   CONNECTICUT, 
DECEMBER    15th,    1814. 


THIRD   EDITION,   CORRECTED   AND   IMPROVE*. 


BOSTON : 
POINTED  AND  PUBLISHED  BY  WELLS  AND  LILLY 

1815. 


REPORT,  &e, 


THE  Delegates  from  the  Legislatures  of  the  States  of  Massa 
chusetts,  Connecticut,  and  Rhode-Island,  and  from  the 
Counties  .of  Grafton  and  Cheshire  in  the  State  of  New- 
Hampshire  and  the  county  of  Windham  in  the  State  of 
Vermont,  assembled  in  Convention,  beg  leave  to  report  the 
followin  result  of  their  conference. 


THE  Convention  is  deeply  impressed  with  a  sense  of  the  ardu 
ous  nature  of  the  commission  which  they  were  appointed  to  exe 
cute,  of  devising  the  means  of  defence  against  dangers,  and  of  re 
lief  from  oppressions  proceeding  from  the  act  of  their  own  Go 
vernment,  without  violating  constitutional  principles,  or  disap 
pointing  the  hopes  of  a  suffering  and  injured  people.  To  pre 
scribe  patience  and  firmness  to  those  who  are  already  exhausted 
by  distress,  is  sometimes  to  drive  them  to  despair,  and  the  pro 
gress  towards  reform  by  the  regular  road,  is  irksome  to  those 
whose  imaginations  discern,  and  whose  feeHngs  prompt,  to  a 
shorter  course.  —  But  when  abuses,  reduced  to  system  and  accu 
mulated  through  a  course  of  years,  have  pervaded  every  depart 
ment  of  Government,  and  spread  corruption  through  every  re 
gion  of  the  State  ;  when  these  are  clothed  with  the  forms  of  law, 
and  enforced  by  an  Executive  whose  will  is  their  source,  ne 
summary  means  of  relief  can  be  applied  without  recourse  to  di 
rect  and  open  resistance.  This  experiment,  even  when  justifia 
ble,  cannot  fail  to  be  painful  to  the  good  citizen  ;  and  the  suc 
cess  of  the  effort  will  be  no  security  against  the  danger  of  the 
example.  Precedents  of  resistance  to  the  worst  administration, 
are  eagerly  seized  by  those  who  are  naturally  hostile  to  the  best. 
Necessity  alone  can  sanction  a  resort  to  this  measure  ;  and  it 
should  never  be  extended  in  duration  or  degree  beyond  the  exi 
gency,  until  the  people,  not  merely  in  the  fervour  of  sudden 
excitement,  but  after  full  deliberation,  are  determined  to  change 
the  Constitution. 

It  is  a  truth,  not  to  be  concealed,  that  a  sentiment  prevails  to 
no  inconsiderable  extent,  that  Administration  have  given  such 
constructions  to  that,  instrument,  and  practised  so  many 


under  colour  of  its  authority,  that  the  time  tor  a  change  is  at 
hand.  Those  who  so  believe,  regard  the  evils  which  surround 
them  as  intrinsic  and  incurable  defects  in  the  Constitution. 
They  yield  to  a  persuasion,  that  no  change,  at  any  time,  or  on 
any  occasion,  can  aggravate  the  misery  of  their  country.  This 
opinion  may  ultimately  prove  to  be  correct.  But  as  the  evi 
dence  on  which  it  rests  is  not  yet  conclusive,  and  as  measures 
adopted  upon  the  assumption  of  its  certainty  might  be  irrevoca 
ble,  some  general  considerations  are  submitted,  in  the  hope  of 
reconciling  all  to  a  course  of  moderation  and  firmness,  which  may 
save  them  from  the  regret  incident  to  sudden  decisions,  proba 
bly  avert  the  evil,  or  at  least  insure  consolation  and  success  in 
the  last  resort. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  under  the  auspices  of 
a  wise  and  virtuous  Administration,  proved  itself  competent  to  all 
the  objects  of  national  prosperity,  comprehended  in  the  views  of 
its  framers.  No  parallel  can  be  found  in  history,  of  a  transition 
so  rapid  as  that  of  the  United  States  from  the  lowest  depression 
to  the  highest  felicity — from  the  condition  of  weak  and  disjointed 
republicks,  to  that  of  a  great,  united,  and  prosperous  nation. 

Although  this  high  state  of  publick  happiness  has  undergone  a 
miserable  and  afflicting  reverse,  through  the  prevalence  of  a  weak 
and  profligate  policy,  yet  the  evils  and  afflictions  which  have 
thus  been  induced  upon  the  country,  are  not  peculiar  to  any 
form  of  Government.  The  lust  and  caprice  of  power,  the  cor 
ruption  of  patronage,  the  oppression  of  the  weaker  interests  of 
the  community  by  the  stronger,  heavy  taxes,  wasteful  expendi 
tures,  and  unjust  and  ruinous  wars,  are  the  natural  offspring  of 
bad  Administrations,  in  all  ages  and  countries.  It  was  indeed 
to  be  hoped,  that  the  rulers  of  these  States  would  not  make  such 
disastrous  haste  to  involve  their  infancy  in  the  embarrassments  of 
old  and  rotten  institutions.  Yet  all  this  have  they  done  ;  and 
their  conduct  calls  loudly  for  their  dismission  and  disgrace.  But 
to  attempt  upon  every  abuse  of  power  to  change  the  Constitu 
tion,  would  be  to  perpetuate  the  evils  of  revolution. 

Again,  the  experiment  of  the  powers  of  the  Constitution,  t© 
regain  its  vigour,  and  of  the  people  to  recover  from  their  delusions,  . 
has  been  hitherto  made  under  the  greatest  possible  disadvantages 
arising  from  the  state  of  the  world.  The  fierce  passions  which 
have  convulsed  the  nations  of  Europe,  have  passed  the  Ocean, 
and  finding  their  way  to  the  bosoms  of  our  citizens,  have  afforded 
to  Administration  the  means  of  perverting  publick  opinion,  in 
respect  to  our  foreign  relations,  so  as  to  acquire  its  aid  in  the 
indulgence  of  their  animosities,  and  the  increase  of  their  adhe 
rents.  Further,  a  reformation  of  publick  opinion,  resulting  from 
deat-  bought  experience,  in  the  Southern  Atlantick  Slates,  at  least, 


&  not  to  be  despaired  of.  They  will  hare  felt,  that  the  Eastern 
States  cannot  be  made  exclusively  the  victims  of  a  capricious 
and  impassioned  policy. — They  will  have  seen  that  the  great  and 
essential  interests  of  the  people,  are  common  to  the  South  and 
to  the  East.  They  will  realize  the  fatal  errours  of  a  system, 
which  seeks  revenge  for  commercial  injuries  in  the  sacrifice  of 
commerce,  and  aggravates  by  needless  wars,  to  an  immeasurable 
extent,  the  injuries  it  professes  to  redress.  They  may  discard 
the  influence  of  visionary  theorists,  and  recognize  the  benefits  of 
a  practical  policy.  Indications  of  this  desirable  revolution  of 
opinion,  among  our  brethren  in  those  States, .are  already  mani 
fested. — While  a  hope  remains  of  its  ultimate  completion,  its 
progress  should  not  be  retarded  or  stopped,  by  exciting  fears 
which  must  check  these  favourable  tendencies,  and  frustrate  the 
efforts  of  the  wisest  and  best  men  in  those  States,  to  accelerate 
this  propitious  change. 

Finally,  if  the  Union  be  destined  to  dissolution,  by  reason  of 
the  multiplied  abuses  of  bad  administrations,  it  should,  if  possible, 
be  the  work  of  peaceable  times,  and  deliberate  consent. — Some 
new  form  of  confederacy  should  be  substituted  among  those 
States,  which  shall  intend  to  maintain  a  federal  relation  to  each 
other. — Events  may  prove  that  the  causes  of  our  calamities  are 
deep  and  permanent.  They  may  be  found  to  proceed,  not  merely 
from  the  blindness  of  prejudice,  pride  of  opinion,  violence  of  party 
spirit,  or  the  confusion  of  the  times ;  but  they  may  be  traced  to 
implacable  combinations  of  individuals,  or  of  States,  to  monopo 
lize  power  and  office,  and  to  trample  without  remorse  upon  the 
rights  and  interests  of  commercial  sections  of  the  Union.  When 
ever  it  shall  appear  that  these  causes  are  radical  and  permanent, 
a  separation  by  equitable  arrangement,  will  be  preferable  to  an 
alliance  by  constraint,  among  nominal  friends,  but  real  enemies, 
inflamed  by  mutual  hatred  and  jealousies,  and  inviting  by  intestine 
divisions,  contempt,  and  aggression  from  abroad.  But  a  severance 
of  the  Union  by  one  or  more  States,  against  the  will  of  the  rest, 
and  especially  in  a  time  of  war,  can  be  justified  only  by  absolute 
necessity.  These  are  among  the  principal  objections  against 
precipitate  measures  tending  to  disunite  the  States,  and  when 
examined  in  connexion  with  the  farewell  address  of  the  Father 
of  his  country,  they  must,  it  is  believed,  be  deemed  conclusive. 

Under  these  impressions,  the  Convention  have  proceeded  to 
confer  and  deliberate  upon  the  alarming  state  of  publick  affairs, 
especially  as  affecting  the  interests  of  the  people  who  have  ap 
pointed  them  for  this  purpose,  and  they  are  naturally  led  to  a 
consideration,  in  the  first  place,  of  the  dangers  and  grievances 
which  menace  an  immediate  or  speedy  pressure,  with  a  view  of 
suggesting  meatis  of  present  relief;  in  the  next  place,  of  sucfe 


as  are  of  a  more  remote  and  general  description,  in  the  hope  of 
attaining  future  security. 

Among  the  subjects  of  complaint  and  apprehension,  which 
might  be  comprised  under  the  former  of  these  propositions,  the 
atlention  of  the  Convention  has  been  occupied  with  the  claims 
and  pretensions  advanced,  and  the  authority  exercised  over  the 
militia,  by  the  executive  and  legislative  departments  of  the  Na 
tional  Government.  Also,  upon  the  destitution  of  the  means  of 
defence  in  which  the  Eastern  States  are  left ;  while  at  the  same 
time  they  are  doomed  to  heavy  requisitions  of  men  and  money 
for  national  objects. 

The  authority  of  the  National  Government  over  the  militia  is 
derived  from  those  clauses  in  the  Constitution  which  give  power 
to  Congress  "  to  provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia,  to  execute 
the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrections  and  repel  inva 
sions" — Also,  "  to  provide  for  organizing,  arming  and  discipli 
ning  the  militia,  and  for  governing  such  parts  of  them  as  may 
be  employed  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  reserving  to 
the  States  respectively  the  appointment  of  the  -officers,  and  the 
authority  of  training  the  militia  according  to  the  discipline  pre 
scribed  by  Congress."  Again,  *'  The  President  shall  be  Com 
mander  in  Chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and 
of  the  militia  of  the  several  States,  when  called  into  the  actual 
service  of  the  United  States."  In  these  specified  cases  only, 
has  the  National  Government  any  power  over  the  militia  ;  and  it 
follows  conclusively,  that  for  all  general  and  ordinary  purposes, 
this  power  belongs  to  the  States  respectively,  and  to  them  alone. 
It  is  not  only  with  regret,  but  with  astonishment,  the  Convention 
perceive  that  under  colour  of  an  authority  conferred  with  such 
plain  and  precise  limitations,  a  power  is  arrogated  by  the  execu 
tive  government,  and  in  some  instances  sanctioned  by  the  two 
Houses  of  Congress,  of  control  over  the  militia,  which  if  conce 
ded,  will  render  nugatory  the  rightful  authority  of  the  individual 
States  over  that  class  of  men,  and  by  placing  at  the  disposal  of 
the  National  Government  the  lives  and  services  of  the  great  body 
of  the  people,  enable  it  at  pleasure  to  destroy  their  liberties,  and 
erect  a  military  despotism  on  the  ruins. 

An  elaborate  examination  of  the  principles  assumed  for  the 
basis  of  these  extravagant  pretensions,  of  the  consequences  to 
which  they  lead,  and  of  the  insurmountable  objections  to  their 
admission,  would  transcend  the  limits  of  this  Report.  A  few 
general  observations,  with  an  exhibition  of  the  character  of  these 
pretensions,  and  a  recommendation  of  a  strenuous  opposition  to 
them,  must  not  however  be  omitted. 

It  will  not  be  contended,  that  by  the  terms  used  in  the  con 
stitutional  compact,  the  power  of  the  National  Government  to 


call  out  the  militia  is  other  than  a  power  expressly  limited  to 
three  cases.     One  of  these  must  exist  as  a  condition  precedent 
to  the  exercise  of  that  power— Unless  the  laws  shall  be  opposed, 
or  an  insurrection  shall  exist,  or  an  invasion  shall  be  made,  Con-/ 
gress,  and  of  consequence  the  President  as  their  organ,  has  no  „ 
more  power  over  the  militia  than  over  the  armies  of  a  foreign 
nation. 

But  if  the  declaration  of  the  President  should  be  admitted  to 
be  an  unerring  test  of  the  existence  of  these  cases,  this  important 
power  would  depend,  not  upon  the  truth  of  the  fact,  but  upon  ex 
ecutive  infallibility  ;  and  the  limitation  of  the  power  would 
consequently  be  nothing  more  than  merely  nominal,  as  it  might 
always  be  eluded.  It  follows  therefore  that  the  decision  of  the 
President  in  this  particular  cannot  be  conclusive.  It  is  as  much 
the  duty  of  the  State  authorities  to  watch  over  the  rights  reserv 
ed,  as  of  the  United  States  to  exercise  the  powers  which  are 
delegated. 

The  arrangement  of  the  United  States  into  military  districts, 
with  a  small  portion  of  the  regular  force,  under  an  officer  of  high 
rank  of  the  standing  army,  with  power  to  call  for  the  militia,  as 
circumstances  in  his  judgment  may  require ;  and  to  assume  the 
command  of  them,  is  not  warranted  by  the  Constitution  or  any 
law  of  the  United  States.  It  is  not  denied  that  Congress  may 
delegate  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  the  power  to  call 
forth  the  militia  in  the  cases  which  are  within  their  jurisdiction — 
But  he  has  no  authority  to  substitute  military  prefects  through 
out  the  Union,  to  use  their  own  discretion  in  such  instances.  To 
station  an  officer  of  the  army  in  a  military  district  without  troops 
corresponding  to  his  rank,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  command 
of  the  militia  that  may  be  called  into  service,  is  a  manifest  evasion 
of  that  provision  of  the  Constitution  which  expressly  reserves  to 
the  States  the  appointment  of  the  officers  of  the  militia  ;  and  the 
object  of  detaching  such  officer  cannot  be  well  conceived  to  be 
any  other,  than  that  of  superseding  the  Governour  or  other  officers 
of  the  militia  in  their  right  to  command. 

The  power  of  dividing  the  militia  of  the  States  into  classes,  and 
obliging  such  classes  to  furnish  by  contract  or  draft,  able  bodied 
men,  to  serve  for  one  or  more  years  for  the  defence  of  the  fron 
tier,  is  not  delegated  to  Congress.  If  a  claim  to  draft  the  militia 
for  one  year  for  such  general  object  be  admissible,  no  limitation 
can  be  assigned  to  it,  but  the  discretion  of  those  who  make  the 
law.  Thus  with  a  power  in  Congress  to  authorise  such  a  draft 
or  conscription,  and  in  the  Executive  to  decide  conclusively 
upon  the  existence  and  continuance  of  the  emergency,  the  whole 
militia  may  be  converted  into  a  standing  army  disposable  at  the 
will  of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 


power  of  compelling  the  militia  and  other  citizens  of  the 
tJnited  States,  by  a  forcible  draft  or  conscription  to  serve  in  the 
regular  armies,  as  proposed  in  a  late  official  letter  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  is  not  delegated  to  Congress  by  the  Constitution,  and 
Hie  exercise  of  it  would  be  not  less  dangerous  to  their  liberties, 
than  hostile  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  States.  The  effort  to  de 
duce  this  power  from  the  right  of  raising  armies,  is  a  flagrant 
attempt  to  pervert  the  sense  of  the  clause  in  the  Constitution 
which  confers  that  right,  and  is  incompatible  with  other  pro 
visions  in  that  instrument.  The  armies  of  the  United  States 
have  always  been  raised  by  contract,  never  by  conscription,  and 
nothing  more  can  be  wanting  to  a  Government,  possessing  the 
power  thus  claimed,  to  enable  it  to  usurp  the  entire  control  of 
the  militia,  in  derogation  of  the  authority  of  the  State,  and  to 
convert  it  by  impressment  into  a  standing  army. 

It  may  be  here  remarked,  as  a  circumstance  illustrative  of  the 
determination  of  the  Executive  to  establish  an  absolute  control 
over  all  descriptions  of  citizens,  that  the  right  of  impressing  sea 
men  into  the  naval  service  is  expressly  asserted  by  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Navy  in  a  late  report  Thus  a  practice,  which  in  a 
foreign  government  has  been  regarded  with  great  abhorrence  by 
the  people,  finds  advocates  among  those  who  have  been  the  loud 
est  to  condemn  it. 

The  law  authorizing  the  enlistment  of  minors  and  apprentices 
into  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  without  the  consent  of 
parents  and  guardians,  is  also  repugnant  to  the  spirit  of  the  Con 
stitution.  By  a  construction  of  the  power  to  raise  armies,  as 
applied  by  our  present  rulers,  not  only  persons  capable  of  con 
tracting  are  liable  to  be  impressed  into  the  army,  but  those  who 
are  under  legal  disabilities  to  make  contracts,  are  to  be  invested 
with  this  capacity,  in  order  to  enable  them  to  annul  at  pleasure 
contracts  made  in  their  behalf  by  legal  guardians.  Such  an 
interference  with  the  municipal  laws  and  rights  of  the  several 
States,  could  never  have  been  contemplated  by  the  framers  of 
the  Constitution.  It  impairs  the  salutary  control  and  influence 
of  the  parent  over  his  child — the  master  over  his  servant — the 
guardian  over  his  ward — and  thus  destroys  the  most  important 
relations  in  society,  so  that  by  the  conscription  of  the  father,  and 
the  seduction  of  the  son,  the  power  of  the  Executive  over  all  the 
effective  male  population  of  the  United  States  is  made  complete. 

Such  are  eome  of  the  odious  features  of  the  novel  system  pro 
posed  by  the  rulers  of  a  free  country,  under  the  limited  power* 
derived  from  the  Constitution.  What  portion  of  them  will  be 
embraced  in  acts  finally  to  be  passed,  it  is  yet  impossible  to  de» 
termine.  It  is,  however,  sufficiently  alarming  to  perceive,  that 
these  projectse  manate  from  the  highest  authority ;  nor  should  it 


fee  forgotten,  that  by  the  plan  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  the 
gification  of  the  militia  embraced  the  principle  of  direct  taxation 
upon  the  white  population  only ;  and  that,  in  the  House  of  Re-- 
presentatives,  a  motion  to  apportion  the  militia  among  the  white 
population  exclusively,  which  would  have  been  in  its  operation  a 
direct  tax,  was  strenuously  urged  and  supported. 

In  this  whole  series  of  devices  and  measures  for  raising  men, 
this  Convention  discern  a  total  disregard  for  the  Constitution,  and 
a  disposition  to  violate  its  provisions,  demanding  from  the  indi 
vidual  States  a  firm  and  decided  opposition.  An  iron  despotism, 
ean  impose  no  harder  servitude  upon  the  citizen,  than  to  force 
him  from  his  home  and  his  occupation,  to  wage  offensive  wars, 
undertaken  to  gratify  the  pride  or  passions  of  his  master.  The 
example  of  France  has  recently  shewn  that  a  cabal  of  individualf 
assuming  to  act  in  the  name  of  the  people,  may  transform  the 
great  body  of  citizens  into  soldiers,  and  deliver  them  over  into 
the  hands  of  a  single  tyrant.  No  war,  not  held  in  just  abhor 
rence  by  a  people,  can  require  the  aid  of  such  stratagems  to 
recruit  an  army.  Had  the  troops  already  raised,  and  in  great 
numbers  sacrificed  upon  the  frontier  of  Canada,  been  employed 
for  the  defence  of  the  country,  and  had  the  millions  which  have 
been  squandered  with  shameless  profusion,  been  appropriated  to 
their  payment,  to  the  protection  of  the  coast,  and  to  the  naval 
service,  there  would  have  been  no  occasion  for  unconstitutional 
expedients.  Even  at  this  late  hour,  let  Government  leave  to 
New-England  the  remnant  of  her  resources,  and  she  is  ready  and 
able  to  defend  her  territory,  and  to  resign  the  glories  arid  advan 
tages  of  the  b6rder  war,  to  those  who  are  determined  to  persist 
in  its  prosecution. 

That  acts  of  Congress  in  violation  of  the  Constitution  are  ab 
solutely  void,  is  an  undeniable  position.  It  does  not,  however, 
consist  with  the  respect  and  forbearance  due  from  a  confederate 
State  towards  the  Genera!  Government,  to  fly  to  open  resistance 
upon  every  infraction  of  the  Constitution.  The  mode  and  the 
energy  of  the  opposition  should  always  conform  to  the  nature 
of  the  violation,  the  intention  of  its  authors,  the  extent  of  the 
injury  inflicted,  the  determination  manifested  to  persist  in  it,  and 
the  danger  of  delay.  But  in  case*  of  deliberate,  duigerous,  and 
palpable  infractions  of  the  Constitution,  affecting  the  sovereignty 
of  a  State,  and  liberties  of  the  people  ;  it  is  not  only  the  right 
but  the  duty  of  such  a  State  to  interpose  its  authority  for  their 
protection,  in  the  manner  best  calculated  to  secure  that  end, 
When  emergencies  occur  which  are  either  beyond  the  reach  of 
the  judicial  tribunals,  or  too  pressing  to  admit  of  the  delay  inci 
dent  to  their  forms,  States,  which  have  no  common  umpire,  must 
be  their  own  judges,  and  execute  their  own  decision!*  It. 


3* 

thus  be  proper  for  the  several  States  to  await  the  ultimate  $** 
posal  of  the  obnoxious  measures,  recommended  by  the  Secretary 
of  War,  or  pending  beforfc  Congress,  and  so  to  use  their  power 
according  to  the  character  these  measures  shall  finally  assume, 
as  effectually  to  protect  their  own  sovereignty,  and  the  rights 
and  liberties  of  their  citizens. 

The  next  subject  which  has  occupied  the  attention  of  the 
Convention,  is  the  means  of  defence  against  the  common  enemy. 
This  naturally  leads  to  the  inquiries,  whether  any  expectation 
can  be  reasonably  entertained,  that  adequate  provision  for  the 
defence  of  the  Eastern  Slates  will  be  made  by  the  National 
Government  ?  Whether  the  several  States  can,  from  their  owa 
resources,  provide  for  self-defence  and  fulfil  the  requisitions 
which  are  to  be  expected  for  the  national  Treasury  ?  and,  gene 
rally,  what  course  of  conduct  ought  to  be  adopted  by  those 
States,  in  relation  to  the  great  object  of  defence  ? 

Without  pausing  at  present  to  comment  upon  the  causes  of 
the  war,  it  may  be  assumed  as  a  truth,  officially  announced,  that 
to  achieve  the  conquest  of  Canadian  territory,  and  to  hold  it  as 
a  pledge  for  peace,  is  the  deliberate  purpose  of  Administration. 
This  enterprise,  commenced  at  a  period  when  Government  pos 
sessed  the  advantage  of  selecting  the  time  and  occasion  for  mak 
ing  a  sudden  descent  upon  an  unprepared  enemy,  now  languishes 
in  the  third  year  of  the  war.  It  has  been  prosecuted  with  vari 
ous  fortune,  and  occasional  brilliancy  of  exploit,  but  without  any 
solid  acquisition.  The  British  armies  have  been  recruited  by 
veteran  regiment*.  Their  navy  commands  Ontario.  The  Ame 
rican  ranks  arc  thinned  by  the  casualties  of  war.  Recruits  are 
discouraged  by  the  unpopular  character  of  the  contest,  and  by 
the  uncertainty  of  receiving  their  pay. 

In  the  prosecution  of  this  favourite  warfare,  Administrate* 
have  left  the  exposed  and  vulnerable  parts  of  the  country  desti 
tute  of  all  efficient  means  of  defence.  The  main  body  of  the 
regular  army  has  been  marched  to  the  frontier. — The  navy  has 
been  stripped  of  a  great  part  of  its  sailors  for  the  service  of  the 
Lakes.  Meanwhile  the  enemy  scours  the  .sea-coast,  blockades 
our  ports,  ascends  our  bays  and  rivers,  makes  actual  descents  in 
various  and  distant  places,  holds  some  by  force,  and  threatens 
all  that  are  assailable  with  fire  and  sword.  The  sea-board  of 
four  of  the  New-England  States,  following  its  curvatures,  pre 
sents  an  extent  of  more  than  seven  hundred  miles,  generally  oc 
cupied  by  a  compact  population,  and  accessible  by  a  naval  force, 
exposing  a  mass  of  people  and  property  to  the  devastation  of 
the  enemy,  which  bears  a  great  proportion  to  the  residue  of  the 
maritime  frontier  of  the  United  Stales.  This  extensive  shore 
has  been  exposed  to  frequent  attacks,  repeated  contributions^ 


11 

«Lud  eenstant  alarms.  The  regular  forces  detached  by  the  na* 
tional  Government  for  its  defence,  are  mere  pretexts  for  placing 
officers  of  high  rank  in  command.  They  are  besides  confined 
(o  a  few  places,  and  are  too  insignificant  in  number  to  be  includy 
ed  in  any  computation. 

These  States  have  thus  been  left  to  adopt  measures  for  their 
own  defence.  The  militia  have  been  constantly  kept  on  the  aiert, 
and  harassed  by  garrison  duties,  and  other  hardships,  while  the 
expenses,  of  which  the  National  Government  decline  the  reim 
bursement,  threaten  to  absorb  all  the  resources  of  the  States, 
The  President  of  the  United  States  has  refused  to  consider  the 
expense  of  the  militia  detached  by  state  authority,  for  the  indis 
pensable  defence  of  the  State,  as  chargeable  to  the  Union,  on  the 
ground  of  a  refusal  by  the  Executive  of  the  State,  to  place  them 
under  the  command  of  officers  of  the  regular  army.  Detachments 
of  militia  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  General  Government,  have 
been  dismissed  either  without  pay,  or  with  depreciated  paper. 
The  prospect  of  the  ensuing  campaign  is  not  enlivened  by  the 
promise  of  any  alleviation  of  these  grievances.  From  authen- 
tick  documents,  extorted  by  necessity  from  those  whose  incli 
nation  might  lead  them  to  conceal  the  embarrassments  of  the 
Government,  it  is  apparent  that  the  treasury  is  bankrupt,  and 
its  credit  prostrate.  So  deplorable  is  the  state  of  the  finances, 
that  those  who  feel  for  the  honour  and  safety  of  the  country, 
would  be  willing  to  conceal  the  melancholy  spectacle,  if  those 
whose  infatuation  has  produced  this  state  of  fiscal  concerns,  had 
not  found  themselves  compelled  to  unveil  it  to  public  view. 

If  the  war  be  continued,  there  appears  no  room  for  reliance 
upon  the  national  government  for  the  supply  of  those  means  of 
defence,  which  must  become  indispensable  to  secure  these 
States  from  desolation  and  ruin.  Nor  is  it  possible  that  the 
States  can  discharge  this  sacred  duty  from  their  own  resources, 
and  continue  to  sustain  the  burden  of  the  national  taxes.  The 
Administration,  after  a  long  perseverance  in  plans  to  baffle  every 
effort  of  commercial  enterprise,  had  fatally  succeeded  in  their 
attempts  at  the  epoch  of  the  war.  Commerce,  the  vital  spring 
of  New-England's  prosperity,  was  annihilated.  Embargoes,  re 
strictions,  and  the  rapacity  of  revenue  officers,  had  completed 
its  destruction.  The  various  objects  for  the  employment  of 
productive  labour,  in  the  branches  of  business  dependent  OH, 
commerce,  have  disappeared.  The  fisheries  have  shared  its 
fate.  Manufactures,  which  Government  has  professed  an  in 
tention  to  favour  and  to  cherish,  as  an  indemnity  for  the  failure 
of  these  branches  of  business,  are  doomed  to  struggle  in  their  in 
fancy  with  taxes  and  obstructions,  which  cannot  fail  most  seri 
ously  to  affect  their  growth,  The  specie  is  withdrawn  froor 


12 

circulation.  The  landed  interest,  the  last  to  feel  these  burden*, 
must  prepare  to  become  their  principal  support,  as  all  other 
sources  of  revenue  must  be  exhausted.  Under  these  circum 
stances,  taxes,  of  a  description  and  amount  unprecedented  in 
this  country,  are  in  a  train  of  imposition,  the  burden  of  which 
must  fall  with  the  heaviest  pressure  upon  the  states  east  of  the 
Potowmac.  The  amount  of  these  taxes  for  the  ensuing  year, 
cannot  be  estimated  at  less  than  five  millions  of  dollars  upon  the 
New-England  States,  and  the  expenses  of  the  last  year  for  de* 
fence,  in  Massachusetts  alone,  approaches  to  one  million  of 
dollars. 

From  these  facts,  it  is  almost  superfluous  to  state  the  irre 
sistible  inference,  that  these  States  have  no  capacity  of  defray 
ing  the  expense  requisite  for  their  own  protection,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  of  discharging  the  demands  of  the  national  treasury. 

The  last  inquiry,  \vhat  course  of  conduct  ought  to  be  adopted 
by  the  aggrieved  States,  is  in  a  high  degree  momentous.  When 
a  great  and  brave  people  shall  feel  themselves  deserted  by  their 
Government,  and  reduced  to  the  necessity  either  of  submission 
to  a  foreign  enemy,  or  of  appropriating  to  their  own  use  those 
means  of  defence  which  are  indispensable  io  self-preservation, 
they  cannot  consent  to  wait  passive  spectators  of  approaching 
ruin,  which  it  is  in  their  power  to  avert,  and  to  resign  the  last 
remnant  of  their  industrious  earnings,  to  be  dissipated  in  support 
of  measures  destructive  of  the  best  interests  of  the  nation. 

This  Convention  will  not  trust  themselves  to  express  their 
conviction  of  the  catastrophe  to  which  such  a  state  of  things  in 
evitably  tends.  Conscious  of  their  high  responsibility  to  God 
and  their  country,  solicitous  for  the  continuance  of  the  Union, 
as  well  as  the  sovereignty  of  the  States,  unwilling  to  furnish  ob 
stacles  to  peace — resolute  never  to  submit  to  a  foreign  enemy,  and 
confiding  in  the  Divine  care  and  protection,  they  will,  until  the 
last  hope  shall  be  extinguished,  endeavour  to  avert  such  conse 
quences.. 

With  this  view  they  suggest  an  arrangement,  which  may  at 
once  be  consistent  with  the  honour  and  interest  of  the  National 
Government,  and  the  security  of  these  States.  This  it  will  not 
be  difficult  to  conclude,  if  that  government  should  be  so  dis 
posed.  By  the  terms  of  it  these  States  might  be  allowed  to  as 
sume  their  own  defence,  by  the  militia  or  other  troops.  A  rea 
sonable  portion,  also,  of  the  taxes  raised  in  each  State  might  be 
paid  into  its  treasury,  and  credited  to  the  United  States,  but  to 
be  appropriated  to  the  defence  of  such  State,  to  be  accounted 
for  with  the  United  States.  No  doubt  is  entertained,  that  by 
such  an  arrangement,  this  portion  of  the  country  could  be  de 
fended  with  greater  effect,  and  in  a  mode  more  consistent  with 


13 

fcconamy,  and  the  public  convenience,  than  any  which  has  been 
practised. 

Should  an  application  for  these  purposes,  made  to  Congress 
by  the  State  Legislatures,  be  attended  with  success,  and  should 
peace  upon  just  terms  appear  to  be  unattainable,  the  people  would 
stand  together  for  the  common  defence,  until  a  change  of  Ad 
ministration,  or  of  disposition  in  the  enemy,  should  facilitate  the 
occurrence  of  that  auspicious  event.  It  would  be  inexpedient 
for  this  Convention  to  diminish  the  hope  of  a  successful  issue  to 
such  an  application,  by  recommending,  upon  supposition  of  a  con 
trary  event,  ulterior  proceedings.  Nor  is  it  indeed  within  their 
province.  In  a  state  of  things  so  solemn  and  trying  as  may 
then  arise,  the  Legislatures  of  the  States,  or  Conventions  of  the 
whole  people,  or  delegates  appointed  by  them  for  the  express 
purpose  in  another  Convention,  must  act  as  such  urgent  circum 
stances  may  then  require. 

But  the  duty  incumbent  on  this  Convention  will  not  have  been 
performed,  without  exhibiting  some  general  view  of  such  mea 
sures  as  they  deem  essential  to  secure  the  nation  against  a  relapse 
into  difficulties  and  dangers,  should  they,  by  the  blessing  of 
Providence,  escape  from  their  present  condition  without  abso 
lute  ruin.  To  this  end,  a  concise  retrospect  of  the  state  of  this 
nation  under  the  advantages  of  a  wise  Administration,  contrasted 
vith  the  miserable  abyss  into  which  it  is  plunged  by  the  profliga 
cy  and  folly  of  political  theorists,  will  lead  to  some  practical  con 
clusions.  On  this  subject,  it  will  be  recollected,  that  the  imme 
diate  influence  of  the  Federal  Constitution  upon  its  first  adop 
tion,  and  for  twelve  succeeding  years,  upon  the  prosperity  and 
happiness  of  the  nation,  seemed  to  countenance  a  belief  in  the 
transcendency  of  its  perfection  over  all  other  human  institutions. 
In  the  catalogue  of  blessings  which  have  fallen  to  the  lot  of  the 
most  favoured  nations,  none  could  be  enumerated  from  which  our 
country  was  excluded — A  free  Constitution,  administered  by 
great  and  incorruptible  statesmen,  realized  the  fondest  hopes  of 
liberty  and  independence — The  progress  of  agriculture  was 
stimulated  by  the  certainty  of  value  in  the  harvest — and  cem- 
merce,  after  traversing  every  sea,  returned  with  the  riches  of 
every  clime. — A  revenue,  secured  by  a  sense  of  honour,  collected 
without  oppression,  and  paid  without  murmurs,  melted  away  the 
national  debt ;  and  the  chief  concern  of  the  publick  creditor  arose 
from  its  too  rapid  diminution. — The  wars  and  commotions  of  the 
European  nations,  and  the  interruptions  of  their  commercial 
intercourse  afforded  to  those,  who  had  not  promoted,  but  who 
would  have  rejoiced  to  alleviate  their  calamities,  a  fair  and  golden 
opportunity,  by  enriching  themselves  to  lay  a  broad  foundation 
/or  national  wealth. — Although  occasional  vexations  to  com- 


14 

nerce  arose  from  the  furious  collisions  of  the  powers  at  war, 
yet  the  great  and  good  men  of  that  time  conformed  to  the  force 
<of  circumstances  which  they  could  not  control,  and  preserved 
their  country  in  security  from  the  tempests,  which  overwhelmed 
the  old  world,  and  threw  the  wreck  of  their  fortunes  on  these 
shores. — Respect  abroad,  prosperity  at  home,  wise  laws  made 
by  honoured  legislators,  and  prompt  obedience  yielded  by  a  con 
tented  people,  had  silenced  the  enemies  of  republican  institu 
tions. — The  arts  flourished — the  sciences  were  cultivated — the 
comforts  and  conveniences  of  life  were  universally  diffused — arid 
nothing  remained  for  succeeding  administrations,  but  to  reap  the 
advantages,  anu  cherish  the  resources,  flowing  from  the  policy 
of  their  predecessors. 

But  no  sooner  was  a  new  administration  established  in  the 
hands  of  the  party  opposed  to  the  Washington  policy,  than  a 
fixed  determination  was  perceived  and  avowed  of  changing  a  sys 
tem  which  had  already  produced  these  substantial  fruits.  The 
consequences  of  this  change,  for  a  few  years  after  its  commence 
ment,  were  not  sufficient  to  counteract  the  prodigious  impulse 
towards  prosperity,  which  had  been  given  to  the  nation.  But  a 
steady  perseverance  in  the  new  plans  of  administration  at  length 
developed  their  weakness  and  deformity,  but  not  until  a  majority 
of  the  people  had  been  deceived  by  flattery,  and  inflamed  by 
passion,  into  blindness  to  their  defects.  Under  the  withering 
influence  of  this  new  system,  the  declension  of  the  nation  has 
been  uniform  and  rapid.  The  richest  advantages  for  securing 
the  great  objects  of  the  Constitution  have  been  wantonly  rejected. 
While  Europe  reposes  from  the  convulsions  that  had  shaken 
flown  her  ancient  institutions,  she  beholds  with  amazement  this 
remote  country,  once  so  happy  and  so  envied,  involved  in  a  ru 
inous  war,  and  excluded  from  intercourse  with  the  rest  of  the 
world. 

To  investigate  and  explain  the  means  whereby  this  fatal  re- 
Terse  has  been  effected,  would  require  a  voluminous  discussion. 
Nothing  more  can  be  attempted  in  this  Report,  than  a  general 
allusion  to  the  principal  outlines  of  the  policy  which  has  pro 
duced  this  vicissitude.  Among  these  may  be  enumerated 

First. — A  deliberate  and  extensive  system  for  effecting  a 
combination  among  certain  States,  by  exciting  local  jealousies 
and  ambition,  so  as  to  secure  to  popular  leaders  in  one  section  of 
the  Union,  the  control  of  publick  affairs,  in  perpetual  succession. 
To  which  primary  object  most  other  characteristicks  of  the  sys 
tem  may  be  reconciled. 

-Secondly. — The  political  intolerance  displayed  and  avowed, 
in  excluding  from  office  men  of  unexceptioaable  merit,  for 
of  adherence  to  the  executive  creed. 


thirdly. — The  infraction  of  the  judiciary  authority  ami 
.tights,  by  depriving  judges  of  their  offices  in  violation  of  the 
Constitution. 

Fourthly.- — The  abolition  of  existing  Taxes,  requisite  to  pre 
pare  the  Country  for  (hose  changes  to  which  nations  are  always 
exposed,  with  a  view  to  the  acquisition  of  popular  favour. 

Fifthly. — The  influence  of  patronage  in  the  distribution  of 
offices,  which  in  these  states  has  been  almost  invariably  made 
among  men  the  least  entitled  to  such  distinction,  and  who  have 
sold  themselves  as  ready  instruments  for  distracting  publick 
opinion,  and  encouraging  administration  to  hold  in  contempt  the 
wishes  and  remonstrances  of  a  people  thus  apparently  divided. 

Sixthly. — The  admission  of  new  States  into  the  Union,  form 
ed  at  pleasure  in  the  western  region,  has  destroyed  the  balance 
of  power  which  existed  among  the  original  States,  and  deeply 
affected  their  interest. 

Seventhly. — The  easy  admission  of  naturalized  foreigners 
to  places  of  trust,  honour  or  profit,  operating  as  an  inducement 
to  the  malcontent  subjects  of  the  old  world  to  come  to  these 
States,  in  quest  of  executive  patronage,  and  to  repay  it  by  an 
abject  devotion  to  executive  measures. 

Eighthly. — Hostility  to  Great-Britain,  and  partiality  to  the 
late  government  of  France,  adopted  as  coincident  with  popular 
prejudice,  and  subservient  to  the  main  object,  party  power. 
Connected  with  these  must  be  ranked  erroneous  and  distorted 
estimates  of  the  power  and  resources  of  those  nations,  of  the  pro 
bable  results  of  their  controversies,  and  of  our  political  relations 
to  them  respectively. 

Lastly  and  principally. — A  visionary  and  superficial  theory 
in  regard  to  commerce,  accompanied  by  a  real  hatred  but  a  feign 
ed  regard  to  its  interests,  and  a  ruinous  perseverance  in  efforts 
to  render  it  an  instrument  of  coercion  and  war. 

But  it  is  not  conceivable  that  the  obliquity  of  any  administra 
tion  could,  in  so  short  a  period,  have  so  nearly  consummated 
the  work  of  national  ruin,  unless  favoured  by  defects  in  the 
Constitution. 

To  enumerate  all  the  improvements  of  which  that  instrument 
is  susceptible,  and  to  propose  such  amendments  as  might  render 
it  in  all  respects  perfect,  would  be  a  task,  which  this  Convention 
has  not  thought  proper  to  assume. — They  have  confined  their 
attention  to  such  as  experience  has  demonstrated  to  be  essential, 
and  even  among  these,  some  are  considered  entitled  to  a  more 
serious  attention  than  others.  They  are  suggested  without  any 
intentional  disrespect  to  other  Stales,  and  are  meant  to  be  such 
as  all  shall  find  an  interest  in  promoting.  Their  object  is  to 
strengthen,  and  if  possible  to  perpetuate,  the  Union  of  the 
States,  by  removing  the  ground*  Of  existing  jealousies,  and  pro- 


ie 

Tiding  for  a  fair  and  equal  representation,  and  a  limitation  of  pow*- 
ers  which  ha^e  been  misused. 

The  first  amendment  proposed,  relates  to  the  apportionment 
of  Representatives  among  the  slave-holding  States.  This  can 
not  be  claimed  as  a  right.  Those  States  are  entitled  to  the  slave 
representation,  by  a  constitutional  compact.  It  is  therefore 
merely  a  subject  of  agreement,  which  should  be  conducted  upon 
principles  of  mutual  interest  and  accommodation,  and  upon  which 
no  sensibility  on  either  side  should  be  permitted  to  exist.  It 
has  proved  unjust  and  unequal  in  its  operation.  Had  this  effect 
been  foreseen,  the  privilege  would  probably  not  have  been  de 
manded  ;  certainly  not  conceded.  Its  tendency  in  future  will 
be  adverse  to  that  harmony  and  mutual  confidence,  which  are 
more  conducive  to  the  happiness  and  prosperity  of  every  con 
federated  State,  than  a  mere  preponderance  of  power,  the  prolifick 
source  of  jealousies  and  controversy,  can  be  to  any  one  of  them. 
The  time  may  therefore  arrive,  when  a  sense  of  magnanimity 
and  justice  will  reconcile  those  States  to  acquiesce  in  a  revision 
of  this  article,  especially  as  a  fair  equivalent  would  result  to  them 
in  the  apportionment  of  taxes. 

The  next  amendment  relates  to  the  admission  of  new  States 
into  the  union. 

This  amendment  is  deemed  to  be  highly  important,  and  in 
fact  indispensable.  In  proposing  it,  it  is  not  intended  to  recog 
nise  the  right  of  Congress  to  admit  new  States  without  the  origi 
nal  limits  of  the  United  States,  nor  is  any  idea  entertained  of 
disturbing  the  tranquillity  of  any  State  already  admitted  into  the 
union.  The  object  is  merely  to  restrain  the  constitutional  power 
of  Congress  in  admitting  new  States.  At  the  adoption  of  the 
Constitution,  a  certain  balance  of  power  among  the  original  par 
ties  was  considered  to  exist,  and  there  was  at  that  time,  and  yet 
is  among  those  parties,  a  strong  affinity  between  their  great  and 
general  interests. — By  the  admission  of  these  States,  that  balance 
has  been  materially  affected,  and  unless  the  practice  be  modi 
fied,  must  ultimately  be  destroyed.  The  Southern  States  will 
first  avail  themselves  of  their  new  confederates  to  govern  the 
East,  and  finally  the  Western  States  multiplied  in  number,  and 
augmented  in  population,  will  control  the  interests  of  the  whole. 
Thus  for  the  sake  of  present  power,  the  Southern  States  will  be 
common  sufferers  with  the  East,  in  the  loss  of  permanent  advan 
tages.  None  of  the  old  States  can  find  an  interest  in  creating 
prematurely  an  overwhelming  Western  influence,  which  may 
hereafter  discern  (as  it  has  heretofore)  benefits  to  be  derived  to 
them  by  wars  and  commercial  restrictions. 

The  next  amendments  proposed  by  the  convention,  relate  to 
the  powers  of  Congress,  in  relation  to  Embargo  and  the  interdk - 
of  commerce. 


Whatever  theories  upon  the  subject  of  commerce  have  hith 
erto  divided  the  opinions  of  statesmen,  experience  has  at  last 
shewn,  that  it  is  a  vital  interest  in  the  United  States,  and  that  its 
success  is  essential  to  the  encouragement  of  agriculture  and  man 
ufactures,  and  to  (he  wealth,  finances,  defence,  and  liberty  of  the 
nation.  Its  welfare  can  never  interfere  with  the  other  great  in 
terests  of  the  State,  but  must  promote  and  uphold  them.  Still, 
those  who  are  immediately  concerned  in  the  prosecution  of  com 
merce,  will  of  necessity  be  always  a  minority  of  the  nation. 
They  are,  however,  best  qualified  to  manage  and  direct  ita 
course  by  the  advantages  of  experience,  and  the  sense  of  inte 
rest.  But  they  are  entirely  unable  to  protect  themselves  against 
the  sudden  and  injudicious  decisions  of  bare  majorities,  and  the 
mistaken  or  oppressive  projects  of  those  who  are  not  actively 
concerned  in  its  pursuits.  Of  consequence,  this  interest  h  al 
ways  exposed  to  be  harassed,  interrupted,  and  entirely  destroy 
ed,  upon  pretence  of  securing  other  interests.  Had  the  mer 
chants  of  this  nation  been  permitted,  by  their  own  government, 
to  pursue  an  innocent  and  lawful  commerce,  how  different  would 
have  been  the  state  of  the  treasury  and  of  publick  credit !  How 
shortsighted  and  miserable  is  the  policy  which  has  annihilated 
this  order  of  men,  and  doomed  their  ships  to  rot  in  the  docks, 
their  capital  to  waste  unemployed,  and  their  affections  to  be 
alienated  from  the  Government  which  was  formed  to  protect 
them  !  What  security  for  an  amp'e  and  unfailing  revenue  can 
ever  be  had,  comparable  to  that  which  once  was  realized  in  the 
.good  faith,  punctuality,  and  sense  of  honour,  which  attached  the 
mercantile  class  to  the  interests  of  the  Government  ?  Without 
commerce,  where  can  be  found  the  aliment  for  a  navy ;  and 
without  a  navy,  what  is  to  constitute  the  defence,  and  ornament, 
and  glory  of  this  nation  ?  No  union  can  be  durably  cemented,  in 
which  every  great  interest  does  not  find  itself  reasonably  secured 
against  the  encroachment  and  combinations  of  other  interests. 
VYhen,  therefore,  the  past  system  of  embargoes  and  commercial 
restrictions  shall  have  been  reviewed — when  the  fluctuation  and 
inconsistency  of  publick  measures,  betraying  a  want  of  information 
as  well  as  feeling  in  the  majority,  shall  have  been  considered, 
the  reasonableness  of  some  restrictions  upon  the  power  of  a  bare 
majority  to  repeat  these  oppressions,  will  appear  to  be  obvious. 

The  next  amendment  proposes  to  restrict  the  power  of  making 
offensive  war.  In  the  consideration  of  this  amendment,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  inquire  into  the  justice  of  the  present  war.  But  one 
sentiment  now  exists  in  relation  to  its  expediency,  and  regret 
for  its  declaration  is  nearly  universal.  No  indemnity  can  ever 
be  attained  for  this  terrible  calamity,  and  its  only  palliation  must 
be  found  in  obstacles  to  its  future  recurrence.  Rarely  can  the 
3 


IB 

state  of  this  country  call  for  or  justify  offensive  war.  The  ge 
nius  of  our  institutions  is  unfavourable  to  its  successful  prosecu 
tion  ;  tire  felicity  of  our  situation  exempts  us  from  its  necessity. 
— In  this  case,  as  in  the  former,  those  more  immediately  expo 
sed  to  its  fatal  effects  are  a  minority  of  the  nation.  The  com 
mercial  towns,  the  shores  of  our  seas  and  rivers,  cofctain  the  pop 
ulation,  whose  vital  interests  are  most  vulnerable  by  a  foreign 
enemy.  Agriculture,  indeed,  must  feel  at  last,  but  this  appeal 
to  its  sensibility  comes  too  late.  Again,  the  immense  population 
which  has  swarmed  into  the  West,  remote  from  immediate  dan 
ger,  and  which  is  constantly  augmenting,  will  not  be  averse  from 
the  occasional  disturbances  of  the  Atlantick  States.  Thus  inte 
rest  may  not  unfrequently  combine  with  passion  and  intrigue,  to 
plunge  the  nation  into  needless  wars,  and  compel  it  to  become  a 
military,  rather  than  a  happy  and  flourishing  people.  These 
considerations,  which  it  would  be  easy  to  augment,  call  loudly  for 
the  limitation  proposed  in  the  amendment. 

Another  amendment,  subordinate  in  importance,  but  still  in  a 
high  degree  expedient,  relates  to  the  exclusion  of  foreigners, 
hereafter  arriving  in  the  United  States,  from  the  capacity  of  hold 
ing  offices  of  trust,  honour  or  profit. 

That  the  stock  of  population  already  in  these  States,  is  amply 
sufficient  to  render  this  nation  in  due  time  sufficiently  great  and 
powerful,  is  not  a  controvertible  question — Nor  will  it  be  seri 
ously  pretended,  that  the  national  deficiency  in  wisdom,  arts, 
science,  arms  or  virtue,  needs  to  be  replenished  from  foreign 
countries.  Still,  it  is  agreed,  that  a  liberal  policy  should  offer 
the  rights  of  hospitality,  and  the  choice  of  settlement,  to  those 
who  are  disposed  to  visit  the  country. — But  why  admit  io  a  par 
ticipation  in  the  government  aliens  who  were  no  parties  to  the 
compact — who  are  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  our  institutions,  and 
have  no  stake  in  the  welfare  of  the  country,  but  what  is  recent 
and  transitory?  It  is  surely  a  privilege  sufficient,  to  admit  them 
after  due  probation  to  become  citizens,  for  all  but  political  pur 
poses. — To  extend  it  beyond  these  limits,  is  to  encourage  for 
eigners  to  come  to  these  states  as  candidates  for  preferment.  The 
Convention  forbear  to  express  their  opinion  upon  the  inauspi 
cious  effects  which  have  already  resulted  to  the  honour  and 
peace  of  this  nation,  from  this  misplaced  and  indiscriminate  lib 
erality. 

The  last  amendment  respects  the  limitation  of  the  office  of 
President  to  a  single  constitutional  term,  and  his  eligibility  from 
the  same  State  two  terms  in  succession. 

Upon  this  topick  it  is  superfluous  to  dilate.  The  love  of 
power  is  a  principle  in  the  human  heart,  which  too  often  impels 
to  the  use  of  all  practicable  means  to  prolong  its  duration.  The 


office  of  President  lias  charms  and  attractions  which  operate  as 
powerful  incentives  to  this  passion.  The  first  and  most  natural 
exertion  of  a  vast  patronage  is  directed  towards  the  security  of 
a  new  election.  The  interest  of  the  country,  the  welfare  of  the 
people,  even  honest  fame  and  respect  for  the  opinion  of  poster 
ity,  are  secondary  considerations.  All  the  engines  of  intrigue, 
all  the  means  of  corruption,  are  likely  to  be  employed  for  this 
object.  A  President,  whose  political  career  is  limited  to  a  single 
election,  may  find  no  other  interest  than  will  be  promoted  by 
making  it  glorious  to  himself,  and  beneficial  to  his  country.  But 
the  hope  of  re-election  is  prolifick  of  temptations,  under  which 
these  magnanimous  motives  are  deprived  of  their  principal  force. 
The  repeated  election  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  from 
any  one  State,  affords  inducements  and  means  for  intrigue,  which 
tend  to  create  an  undue  local  influence,  and  to  establish  the  dom 
ination  of  particular  States.  The  justice,  therefore,  of  securing 
to  every  State  a  fair  and  equal  chance  for  the  election  of  this 
officer  from  its  own  citizens,  is  apparent,  and  this  object  will  be 
essentially  promoted  by  preventing  an  election  from  the  same 
State  twice  in  succession. 

Such  is  the  general  view  which  this  Convention  has  thought 
proper  to  submit,  of  the  situation  of  these  States,  of  their  dan 
gers  and  their  duties.  Most  of  the  subjects  which  it  embraces 
have  separately  received  an  ample  and  luminous  investigation, 
by  the  great  and  able  assertors  of  the  rights  of  their  Country,  in 
the  National  Legislature ;  and  nothing  more  could  be  attempted 
on  this  occasion,  than  a  digest  of  general  principles,  and  of  re 
commendations,  suited  to  the  present  state  of  publick  affairs. 
The  peculiar  difficulty  and  delicacy  of  performing,  even  this 
undertaking,  will  be  appreciated  by  all  who  think  seriously  upon 
the  crisis.  Negociations  for  Peace  are  at  this  hour  supposed  to 
be  pending,  the  issue  of  which  must  be  deeply  interesting  to  all. 
No  measures  should  be  adopted,  which  might  unfavourably  affect 
that  issue  ;  none  which  should  embarrass  the  Administration,  if 
their  professed  desire  for  peace  is  sincere  ;  and  none,  which  on 
supposition  of  their  insincerity,  should  afford  them  pretexts  for 
prolonging  the  war,  or  relieving  themselves  from  the  responsi 
bility  of  a  dishonourable  peace.  It  is  also  devoutly  to  be  wished, 
that  an  occasion  may  be  afforded  to  all  friends  of  the  country,  of 
all  parties,  and  in  all  places,  to  pause  and  consider  the  awful  state,  to 
which  pernicious'  counsels,  and  blind  passions,  have  brought  this 
people.  The  number  of  those  who  perceive,  and  who  are  ready  to 
tetrace  errours,  must,  it  is  believed,  be  yet  sufficient  to  redeem  the 
nation.  It  is  necessary  to  rally  and  unite  them  by  the  assurance, 
that  no  hostility  to  the  Constitution  is  meditated,  and  to  obtain 
their  aid,  in  placing  it  under  guardians,  who  alpne  can  save  it 


from  destruction.  Should  this  fortunate  change  be  effected,  tire 
hope  of  happiness  and  honour  may  once  more  dispel  the  sur 
rounding  gloom.  Our  nation  may  yet  be  great,  our  union  dura 
ble.  But  should  this  prospect  be  utterly  hopeless,  the  time  will 
not  have  been  lost,  which  shall  have  ripened  a  general  sentiment 
of  the  necessity  of  more  mighty  efforts  to  rescue  from  ruin,  at 
least  some  portion  of  our  beloved  Country. 

THEREFORE  RESOLVED— 

THAT  it  be  and  hereby  is  recommended  to  the  Legisla 
tures  of  the  sevetal  Stales  represented  in  this  Convention,  to 
adopt  all  such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  effectually  to  pro 
tect  the  citizens  of  said  Stales  from  the  operation  and  effects  of 
all  acts  which  have  been  or  may  be  passed  by  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States,  which  shall  contain  provisions,  subjecting 
the  militia  or  other  citizens  to  forcible  drafts,  conscriptions,  or 
impressments,  not  authorized  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
Skates. 

Resolved,  That  it  be  and  hereby  is  recommended  to  the  said 
Legislatures,  to  authorize  an  immediate  and  earnest  application 
to  be  made  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  requesting 
their  consent  to  some  arrangement,  whereby  the  said  States 
may,  separately  or  in  concert,  be  empowered  to  assume  upon 
themselves  the  defence  of  their  territory  against  the  enemy  ;  and 
a  reasonable  portion  of  the  taxes,  collected  within  said  States, 
may  be  paid  into  the  respective  treasuries  thereof,  arid  appropri 
ated  to  the  payment  of  the  balance  due  said  States,  and  to  the 
future  defence  of  the  same.  The  amount  so  paid  into  the  said 
treasuries  to  be  credited,  and  the  disbursements  made  as  afore 
said  to  be  charged  to  the  United  States. 

Resolved,  That  it  be,  and  it  hereby  is,  recommended  to  the 
Legislatures  of  the  aforesaid  States,  to  pass  laws  (where  it  has 
not  already  been  done)  authorizing  the  Governours  or  Com 
manders  in  Chief  of  their  militia  to  make  detachments  from  the 
same,  or  to  form  voluntary  corps,  as  shall  be  most  convenient 
and  conformable  to  their  Constitutions,  and  to  cause  the  same  to 
be  well  armed,  equipped  and  disciplined,  and  held  in  readiness 
for  service  ;  and  upon  the  request  of  the  Governour  of  either  of 
the  other  States,  to  employ  the  whole  of  such  detachment  or 
corps,  as  well  as  the  regular  forces  of  the  State,  or  such  part 
thereof  as  may  be  required  and  can  be  spared  consistently  with 
the  safety  of  the  State,  in  assisting  the  State,  making  such  re 
quest  to  repel  any  invasion  thereof  which  shall  be  made  or  at 
tempted  by  the  publick  enemy. 


ai 

Resolved,  That  the  following  amendments  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  be  recommended  to  the  States  represent 
ed  as  aforesaid,  to  be  proposed  by  them  for  adoption  by  the 
State  Legislatures,  and,  in  such  cases  as  may  be  deemed  expe 
dient,  by  a  Convention  chosen  by  the  people  of  each  State. 

Arid  it  is  further  recommended,  that  the  said  States  shall 
persevere  in  their  efforts  to  obtain  such  amendments,  until  the 
same  shall  be  effected. 

First.  Representatives  and  direct  taxes  shall  be  apportion* 
ed  among  the  several  States  which  may  be  included  within  this 
union,  according  to  their  respective  numbers  of  free  persons,  in 
cluding  those  bound  to  serve  for  a  term  of  years,  and  excluding 
Indians  not  taxed,  and  all  other  persons. 

Second.  No  new  State  shall  be  admitted  into  the  union  by 
Congress  in  virtue  of  the  power  granted  by  the  Constitution, 
without  the  concurrence  of  two  thirds  of  both  Houses. 

Third.  Congress  shall  not  have  power  to  lay  any  embargo  on 
the  ships  or  vessels  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  in  the 
ports  or  harbours  thereof,  for  more  than  sixty  days. 

Fourth.  Congress  shall  not  have  power,  without  the  concur 
rence  of  two  thirds  of  both  Houses,  to  interdict  the  commercial 
intercourse  between  the  United  States  and  any  foreign  nation  or 
the  dependencies  thereof. 

Fifth.  Congress  shall  not  make  or  declare  war,  or  authorize 
acts  of  hostility  against  any  foreign  nation,  without  the  concur 
rence  of  two  thirds  of  both  Houses,  except  such  acts  of  hostility 
be  in  defence  of  the  territories  of  the  United  States  when  actu 
ally  invaded. 

Sixth.  No  person  who  shall  hereafter  be  naturalized,  shall 
be  eligible  as  a  member  of  the  Senate  or  House  of  Representa 
tives  of  the  United  States,  nor  capable  of  holding  any  civil  office 
under  the  authority  of  the  United  States. 

Seventh.  The  same  person  shall  not  be  elected  President  of 
the  United  States  a  second  time  ;  nor  shall  the  President  be 
elected  from  the  same  State  two  terms  in  succession. 

Resolved,  That  if  the  application  of  these  States  to  the  go 
vernment  of  the  United  States,  recommended  in  aforegoing  Re 
solution,  should  be  unsuccessful,  and  peace  should  not  be  con 
cluded,  and  the  defence  of  these  States  should  be  neglected,  as 
it  has  been  since  the  commencement  of  the  war,  it  will  in  the 
opinion  of  this  Convention  be  expedient  for  the  Legislatures  of 
the  several  States  to  appoint  Delegates  to  another  Convention, 
to  meet  at  Boston,  in  the  State  of  Massachusetts,  on  the  third 
Thursday  of  June  next,  with  such  powers  and  instructions  as 
the  exigency  of  a  crisis  so  momentous  may  require. 


Resolved,  That  the  Hon.  George  Cabot,  the  Hon.  Chauncey 
Goodrich,  and  the  Hon.  Daniel  Lyman,  or  any  two  of  them,  be 
authorized  to  call  another  meeting  of  this  Convention,  to  be  hoi- 
den  in  Boston,  at  any  time  before  new  Delegates  shall  be  chosen, 
as  recommended  in  the  above  Resolution,  if  in  their  judgment 
ihe  situation  of  the  Country  shall  urgently  require  it. 

HARTFORD,  January  4th,  1815. 

GEORGE  CABOT,  JAMES  HILLHOUSE, 

NATHAN  DANE,  JOHN  TREADWELL, 

WILLIAM  PRESCOTT,  ZEPHANIAH  SWIFT, 

HARRISON  G.  OTIS,  NATHANIEL  SMITH, 

TIMOTHY  BIGELOW,  CALVIN  GODDARD, 

JOSHUA  THOMAS,  ROGER  M.  SHERMAN, 

SAMUEL  S.  WILDE,  DANIEL  LTMAN, 

JOSEPH  LYMAN,  SAMUEL  WARD, 
STEPHEN  LONGFELLOW,  JK.      EDWARD  MANTON, 

DANIEL  WALDO,  BENJAMIN  HAZARD, 

HODIJAH  BAYLIES,  BENJAMIN  WEST, 

GEORGE  BLISS,  MILLS  OLCOTT, 

rHAUNCEY  GOODRICH,  WILLIAM  HALL,  JR. 


STATEMENTS, 


PREPARED    AND    PUBLISHED    BY   ORDER    OF   THE    CONVENTION    OF   DELEGATES, 
HELD    AT    HARTFORD,    DECEMBER    15,    1814, 

AND    PRINTED    BY    THEIR   ORDER. 


SCHEDULE  (A,) 

Shewing  the  ascertained  expenses  of  the  war,  prior  to  July  1,  1814. 

Military  Department,  or  land  forces,  from  January  1,  to  Sept.  30, 

1812,  including   about  six  months   of  peace,   and   three  months  of 

war,  in  that  year,  '  $7,464,814  80 

Prom   Sept.  30,  1812,  to  Sept.    30,  1813,  18,484,750  49 

From  Sept.  30,  1813,  to  Dec.  31,  1813,  5,887,747  00 

From  Jan.  1,  to  July  1,  1814,         -          -          t    ,     11,210,238  00 


Ascertained  expenses  of  the  Land  forces  from  >  *  ,Q  _  ,,  K,A  oft 
Jan.    1,    1812,  to   July  1,  1814,  $  $43'°47'530  29 
Navy  Department,   from  Jan.  1,  to   Sept.  30,  1812, 
about   six  months   of    peace,    and   three  months  of 
war,  the  sum  of  $2,638,612  95 

From    Sept.  30,  1812,  to    Sept  > 

30,    1813,  $      0,4A),707   ^0 

From  Sept.   30,  to   Dec.   31,  1813,     1,248,145  10 
From   Jan.   1,  to   July  1,  1814,  4,012,899  90 

14,320,365  15 


Ascertained   war  expenses  to  July  1,  1814,  $57,367,915  44 

to  which  must  be  added,  large  sums  not  ascertained, 
and,  also  disbursements  made  by  individual  States, 
these  must  be  more  than  -  "  •»;*>•;  -  -  3,000,000  00 


$60,367,915  44 

Note. — The  Military  and  Naval  expenses  of  the  United  States  from 
January  1,  1812,  to  June  18,  1812,  when  war  was  declared,  are  in 
cluded  in  the  above  Account,  and  were,  partly  on  account  of  the  peace 
establishment,  and,  in  part,  preparations  for* war.  So  that  this  enor 
mous  expenditure  was  incurred  in  the  Military  and  Naval  depart 
ments  alone,  in  two  years  of  small  warfare,,  and  in  six  month*  that 
preceded  it. 


SCHEDULE  (B,) 

Shewing  the  receipts  at  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States  from 
January  1,  1812,  to  July  1,  1814,  including  about  6  months  of  peace, 
a*id  about  two  years  of  war,  to  wit — 

From  Jan.  1,  to  Oct.  1,  1812,  from  the  proceedsof 
the  customs,  the  sales  of  land,  &c.  being  three  fourths 
of  the  revenue  year,  -  $8,201,210  18 

The  balance  in  the  Treasury  charged  this  account,    3,947,818  3G 

On  the  11  million  loan  under  the  act  of  March 
14,1812,  -  -  'i  -  -  -  -  5,847,21250 


$17,990,241  04 

Receipts  from  Oct.  1,  1812,  to  Oct.  1, 1813,  to  wit— • 
From  the  proceeds  of  the  customs,  $12,596,491   55 
Sales  of  land,  -         -        830,671   53 

Other  items  of  revenue,  140,879  35 

13,568,042  43 

On  account  of  the  11  million  loan,  $4,337,487  50 
On   the    16   million  loan,  act  Feb. 
8,  1813,        -  -     14,488,125  00 

Treasury  Notes  issued  on  the  act  of 
June   30,    1812,  4,898,300  00 

Do.  do.  act  Feb. 

25,    1813,         -     '    -'•.--          -          •       253,000  00 

23,976,912  50 

Receipts  from  Oct.  1,  1813,  to  Jan. 
1,   1814,  to  wit— 

From    the    customs    and    sales    of 
lands,  &c.  $3,678,565  00 

On  the  16  million  loan,  -,      1,511,875  00 

On  the  seven  and  half  million  loan,  3,907,335  00 
Treasury  notes,         -          -  3,778,700  00 

12,876,475  00 

Receipts   from    Jan.    1,    to  July   1, 
1814,  to  wit— 

From  the   proceeds   of  the  customs,        4,182,088  25 
Sales  of  publick  .lands,  540,065  63 

Internal   duties  and  direct  tax,  2,189,272  40 

Postage  and  incidental  receipts,  166,744  00 


$7,078,170  33 

On  the  7  1-2  million  loan, 
act  Aug.  2,  1813,  -  $3,592,665 

On  10  million  loan  (part 
of  the  25  millions)  .  -  6,087,011 


Carried   forward,  $9,079,676  $7,078,170  33  $68,417,670  97 


25 

Brought  up,  9,679,676  $7,078,170  33  $68,417,670  97 

Treasury  notes 
on  act  Feb.  25, 
1813,  $1,070,000 

Do.         011   act 
March  24,   1814,    1,302,100 

2,462,100-12,141,776   00-19,219,946    33 


87,637,617  30 
Deduct  cash  in  the  treasury,  July  1,   1814,         -         4,722,65932 


Deduct  payments  made  at  the  trea-  $82,914,957  68 

sury   in   the  same  period  from  Jan.  1, 
1812,  to  July  1,  1814,  to  wit— 

The  civil  list,  Indian  department,  &c.  $4,697,872  32 

Interest  and   principal  of  the  publick 
debt,       --:        ....         21,101,41772-25,799,290,04 


Left  for  war  purposes  in  this  period,  $57,115,667,94 

Note. — Thus  while  the  war  cost  "above  60   millions  of  dollars,  and 

the  land  forces  46  millions  of  the  sum,  there  was  but  a  small  British 

army  employed  against  the  United  States,  and  in  this  period,  disgrace 

generally  attended  the  American  arms  by  land. 

SCHEDULE  (C,) 

Shewing  the  great  increase  of  the  revenues  of  the  United  States, 
from  the  adoption  of  (he  Constitution  to  the   adoption  of  the  restric 
tive   system  ;    and    while   commerce  continued   free,  and  the  great 
diminution   of  these   revenues  since  that  system  was  resorted  to — 
they  were  as  follow,  as  by  Treasury  statements. 
Prior  to    1792, 
In         1792, 
1  793, 
1794, 
1795, 
1796, 
1797, 
1798, 
1799, 
1800, 
1801, 
1802, 

Note — As  bonds  were  given  for  the  duties,  and  they  usually  become 
payable  the  next  year — the  duties  payable  in  any  year,  were,  gene 
rally,  collected  on  the  importations  of  the  preceding  year,  as  the 
$17,060,661  received  in  1803  were  the  duties  on  the  great  importa 
tions  of  1807,  a  few  small  sums  excepted. 

Note,  also — All  these  revenues  arose  from  commerce,  except 
$16,262,651. 

It  will  be  observed  that  all  the  sources  of  revenue  exclusive  of  im 
post  and  tonnage  duties,  did  not,  on  an  average,  amount  to  quite  one 
million  of  dollars  a  year;  so  thht  the  impost  and  tonnage  duties.  *the 
4 


$4,418,913             1803, 

11,064,067 

3,661,932 

1804, 

11,828,307 

4,714,423 

1805, 

13,560,663 

5,128,432 

1806, 

15,559,031 

5,954,534 

1807, 

16,398,019 

7,137,529 

1808, 

17,060,661 

8,403,560 

1809, 

7,773,473 

7,820,575 

1810, 

9,384,214 

7,475,773 

1811, 

14,423,529 

10,777,709 

9  months  of  1812, 

6,927,706 

12,846,530 

13,668,223 

$215,988,703 

four  years  preceding  the  long;  embargo,  amounted  to  about  fifty-eight 
millions  of  dollars,  or  to  $14,500,000  a  year.  And  if  there  had  been  no 
embargoes  or  restrictions  on  commerce  these  would  have  increased,  at 
least  not  decreased  till  the  war  was  commenced.  That  commenced 
four  years  and  a  half  after  the  embargo  was  laid.  It  will  be  seen  that 
all  the  revenues  amounted,  in  four  years,  before  the  embargo,  to 
$62,579,274,  and  deducting  for  other  sources  of  revenue,  one  million  a 
year,  there  will  remain  $58,579,274  received  from  imposts  and 
tonnage  duties :  whereas  in  the  three  years  arid  nine  months  after  the 
embargo  was  laid,  all  the  revenues,  as  above,  amounted  only  to 
$38,508,922,  o^  at  the  rate  of  $40,817,990  in  four  years ;  but  in  these 
four  years  were  included,  not  only  the  ordinary  million  a  year,  but  the 
two  million  direct  tax  of  1 798,  and  the  new  internal  duties  of  those 
four  years,  whence  was  collected  at  least  two  millions  and  a  half? 
hence  deduct  $6,500,000  from  $40,817,990  leaves,  received  from  im 
post  and  tonnage  duties  $34,317,990,— $24,261,284  less  than  was 
received  in  the  four  years  preceding  the  embargo ;  that  is,  above  six 
millions  a  year,  or  above  twenty-seven  millions  for  the  four  years  and  a 
half,  the  restrictive  system  existed  before  the  war;  hence  this  sum  wras 
clearly  lost  by  this  system — See  Schedule  P. 

Note,  also — The  said  $16,262,651  was  received  thus, — from  in 
ternal  revenue,  $6,460,003;  direct  tax,  $1,757,240;  sales  of  land, 
$6,161,283  02;  postage  of  letters,  &c.  $667,343;  miscellaneous, 
$1,216,775. 

Therefore,  it  is  clear,  that  if  there  had  been  no  restrictive  system  or 
war,  the  old  debt  of  the  United  States,. would  have  been,  before  this 
time,  paid,  or  nearly  paid. 


SCHEDULE  (D,) 

Shewing  the  state  of  the  army  of  the  United  States  previous  to 
July  1,  1814.  It  was  thus — effectives  27,010;  aggregate  31,539;  sta 
tioned  as  follows  : 

In  the  first  Military  District,  at  Boston,  Portsmouth,  Portland  and 
Eastport,  aggregate  number 

2  Military  District  at  New-London,  Sec. 

3  do.  at  New-York, 

4  do.  at  Fort  Mifflin,  &c. 

5  do.  at  Baltimore,  Norfolk, 

6  do.  North  and  South  Carolina  and  Georgia, 

7  do.  at  New-Orleans,  Mobile,  &c. 

Stationed  on  the  sea  board,  10,650 

8  Military  District  at  Detroit,  Sandwich,  &c.  2,472 

9  do.  division  of  the  right,  11,795 

at  Buffaloe,  Sacket's  harbour,  &c.         6,613 

18,408 

OH  the  Canada  line,  20,88t 

total— 31,539 


27 

Recruits  enlisted  from  January  27,  1814,  to  September  30,  1814,  as 
by  the  return  of  the  Inspector  General  were  13,398 : 
tQ  wit—in  February  1814,  980 

March          „  2,357 

April  „  2,501 

May  „  2,138 

June  ,,  1,445 

July  „  1,486 

August         ,>  1,687 

Sept.  „  1,304 

13,898 

Note — An  army  of  3 1,539,  early  in  the  year  1814,  wag,  no  doubt,  a 
ifiuch  larger  army  than  the  United  States  kept  up  the  two  first  years 
of  the  war;  and  if  properly  employed,  31,000  regular  troops  were  cer 
tainly  adequate  to  oppose  any  force  Great  Britain,  in  those  years, 
employed  against  the  United  States — 31,000  men,  according  to  the 
estimates  of  the  War  and  Treasury  Departments,  should  not  have  cost 
more  than  12  millions  a  year,  or  24  millions  in  the  two  years;  where'  s 
the  land  forces  did  cost  46  millions  arid  more,  in  the  wasteful  manner 
in  which  the  war  was  conducted. 

Note^  also — When  it  is  considered  the  United  States  had  on  the  1st 
of  July,  1814,  a  regular  army  of  31,539,  and  enlisted  in  8  months, 
from  February  1,  to  "October  1,  1814,  13,898  men,  for  what  possil  le 
pretence  can  the  national  government  have  recourse  to  conscription, 
and  measures  destructive  of  the  liberties  of  the  people,  to  fill  the  ranks 
of  the  army  ?  The  course  of  enlistments  amply  proves,  that  if  the  army 
be  well  paid  and  supported,  and  according  to  contracts,  there  can  be 
no  occasion  to  resort  to  such  violent  measures. 

Note,  also — Of  the  10,659  regular  troops  on  the  sea  board,  onty 
1.369  were  stationed  in  New-England. 


SCHEDULE  (E.) 

Though  the  operations  of  the  war  in  1781  and  1782  were  great,  espe 
cially  in  the  Southern  States,  yet  it  cost  America  far  less  than  fifteen 
millions  a  year,  as  will  appear  by  the  publick  documents.  In  1782  Con 
gress  made  an  estimate  for  an  army  of  25,000  men.  This  estimate, 
which  proved  to  be  correct,  was  a  little  over  eight  millions  of  dollars. 
The  individual  States'  expenses  will  be  found  not  to  have  exceeded  four 
millions  a  year,  and  Navy  expenses  were  trifling.  In  1 781  the  expenses 
were  about  three  millions  more  than  in  1782. — Prices  were  about  the 
same  then  as  now. 

The  following  is  an  abstract  of  the  expenditures  of  the  United  States 
from  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  to  Oct.  1,,  1812.  taken  from  Treay 
•mry  Reports : 


Prior  to  1792, 
In  1792, 
1793, 
1794, 
1795, 
1796, 
1797, 
1798, 
1799, 
1800, 
1801, 
1802, 


1,718,129 
1,766,077 
1,707,848 
3,500,348 
4,350,596 
2,531,930 
2,833,5*90 
4,623,223 
6,480,166 
7,411,369 
4,981,669 
3,737,079 


1803, 
1804, 
1805, 
1806, 
1807, 
1808, 
1809, 
1810, 
1811, 
9  months  ofl  8 12, 


4,062,824 
4,052,858 
6,357,234 
6,080,209 
4,984,572 
6,504,338 
7,414,672 
5,311,082 
5,592,604 
11,760,292 

$  107,763,309 


Note.... These  expenditures  do  not  include  the  interest  and  principal 
of"  the  publick  debt. 

Never  after  the  peace  of  1783,  till  1812,  did  the  expenditures  of  the 
United  States  amount  to  seven  millions  and  a  half  in  any  year. 

In  1781  Cornwallis  was  taken,  and  it  is  ascertained  that  over  26,000 
British  troops  were  sent  into  the  four  Southern  States  in  less  than  two 
years  in  1780  and  1781.  The  United  States  were  obliged  to  keep  up 
large  forces  in  the  Middle  and  Northern  States ;  and  the  militia  drafts 
were  often  made  in  those  two  years. — During  the  long  period  from 
March  4,  1789,  to  Oct.  1,  1812,  the  whole  Military  expenditures  of  the 
United  States  were  but  $44,066,745  65  including  Indian  wars,  war  with 
France,  and  with  the  Barbary  powers,  the  Pennsylvania  insurrection, 
and  several  millions  expended  in  the  present  war  before  October,  1812. 
Much  less  than  two  millions  of  dollars  a  year.  And  the  Navy  expen 
ditures  during  the  same  long  period  were  but  $29,889,660  78.  About 
one  million  and  a  quarter  a  year. 

Further,  An  examination  of  the  publick  documents  will  shew,  that  the 
eight-years-war  of  the  revolution  did  not  cost  more  than  205,000,000 
of  specie  dollars.  More  than  half  that  sum  was  expended  in  the  three 
.first  years,  w  hen  paper  money  was  abundant,  and  the  American  and 
British  armies  most  numerous ;  a  period  in  which  we  withstood  the 
forces  of  the  enemy  alone,  in  a  manner  so  honourable  to  our  arms. 

SCHEDULE  (F.) 

This  Schedule  brings  into  one  view  the  great  loss  of  revenue  occa 
sioned  by  the  Restrictive  System,  and  the  enormous  waste  of  publick 
monies  in  the  two  first  years  of  this  war ;  the  particulars  whereof  are 
sLilc;!  iii  the  preceding  Schedules. 

1.  27  millions  of  dollars,  at  least,  \vere  lost  by  reason  of 
restrictions  on  commerce,  for  four  years  and  a  half  before 

the  war  was  declared  or  commenced,  as  in  scheduleC,     $27,000,000 

2.  War  expenses,  as  stated  in  schedule  A,  to  the  amount 
of  $60,367,915,  at  leas't,  were  incurred  in  this  war  before 
July  1,  1814;  whereas,  on  any  scale  of  expenses  of  any 
wars,  ever  carried  on  in  this  country  heretofore,  the  war 
expenses  from  January  1812,  to  July  1,  1814,  ought  not  to 
have  exceeded  27  millions,  if  indeed  they  could  equal  that 
sum.     There  then  was  clearly  a  wasteful  and  improvident 


Amount  brought  forward,  27,000,000 
expenditure  of  publick  monies,  in  the  war  and  navy  depart 
ments,  in  this  short  period,  of  more  than  33  millions  of  dol 
lars,           -         -         -         33,000,000 


Revenue  and  public  monies  lost  by  foolish  restrictions,- 


and  in  a  profligate  management  of  the  war,        -  $60,000,000 

Schedule  E,  also,  shews  how  moderate  our  military  expenses  were 
prior  to  the  present  war. 

Note. ...Had  this  large  sum  been  saved,  as  it  might  have  been,  with 
perfect  ease  by  a  wise  and  economical  administration,  the  credit  of  the 
United  States,  at  this  moment,  would  have  been  unimpaired,  and  the 
very  heavy  direct  and  internal  taxes  now  laid  on  the  people  to  supply 
the  place  of  this  sum,  so  lost  and  wasted,  might  have  been  avoided. 

In  fact,  examine  the  expenditures  of  all  former  wars  in  this  country, 
the  force  brought  against  it  in  the  two  first  years  of  this  war,  and  every 
cause  of  necessary  expenditure,  and  it  will  appear,  that  not  so  much  as 
27  millions  ought  to  have  been  expended  in  the  military  and  naval  de 
partments  in  the  period  in  question. 


SCHEDULE  (G,) 

Shewing  the  amounts  of  the  several  Internal  Duties,  distinctly,  that 
have  accrued  for  the  two  first  quarters  of  the  year  1814.  Ascer 
tained  to  have  been  received  in  each  State  and  Territory  of  the 
United  States,  viz. 


IVaines   of 
States  and 
Territories. 

LiCfiws  loi 
Stills  and 
Boilers. 

Carriages. 

Licenses 
for 
Retailers. 

Duties    on 
Sales  at 
Auction. 

Refined 
Sugar. 

Stamps. 

New-Hamp. 

4817  ik 

bla5  08 

15154 

351  29 

544  05 

Massachusetts, 

61217  8C 

33RO  78 

79220 

12285  05 

120  09 

14281   18 

Vermont, 

19710  52 

2532  18 

12271 

7  96 

13  35 

Rhode-  Island, 

16265  23 

2842  88 

15702 

6039  23 

5329  80 

Connecticut, 

42878  3G 

13092  61 

28556 

79  48  1-2 

7388  37 

New-York, 

154484  67 

21687  23 

156492 

8872  69  1-2 

51935  08 

New-Jer  ey, 

18429  50 

16253  92 

27163 

2823  86 

3350  49 

Pennsylvania, 

271780 

25707  08  1-2 

118852 

10871  61 

45590  45 

Delaware, 

1447  50 

5118  18 

7477 

116  25 

2701  56 

Maryland, 

36736  37 

16965  97  1-2 

42300 

5344  11  1-4 

20300  82  3-4 

Virginia, 

148442  91 

23836  91 

46691 

2018  20 

21378  03  1-2 

North-Caro. 

44780  20 

13594  293-4 

20f>44 

444  14  1-4 

5212  41  3-4 

Georgia, 

11076  68 

6532  12  1-4 

11931 

1003  17 

2145  76 

South-Caro. 

32215  67 

15024  72 

20343 

923  52 

10310  16 

Ohio, 

84708  5C- 

456  24 

15200 

3246  87  1-2 

Kentucky, 

56082  lf» 

2634  69  1-2 

13684 

160  03  1-2 

4185  38 

Tenn^st-ee, 

46855  97 

661  11 

7612 

946  05 

Loui?iana, 

5485  08 

840  81 

7079 

1878  30 

26  25 

7119  86 

Illinois  Ter. 

490  44 

62 

835 

5  60 

Miciiigan     „ 

54 

1135 

28  93 

21  24 

Indiana         „ 

1263  73 

4 

1396 

Missouri       ,, 

2027  38 

75 

1340 

45  45 

Missisippi    „ 

1562  07 

303 

3305 

91  82 

652  76 

Dis.  of  Co'um. 

2044  91 

9505 

154  32 

10159  56 

1062758  99 

214639  73  1-2 

663887 

53494  03 

146  34 

217364  28  1-2 

GROSS  TOTAL— $2,212,290  38. 


SCHEDULE  (H.) 


This  shews  the  great  increase  of  the  commerce  of  the  United  States, 
under  federal  administrations  when  it  was  free.  Also  its  great  diminu 
tion  under  embargoes,  restrictions  and  war.  2.  The  comparative  ex 
ports  of  the  several  States  from  time  to  time.  3.  The  kind  of  exports, 
as  articles  domestick  or  foreign,  as  productions  of  the  forest,  of  agricul 
ture,  of  the  sea,  &c. 

1.  The  exports  of  the  United  States  every  fifth  year,  to  wit 


1791 
1796 
1801 
1806 
1811 


$17,571,551  '45 
67,064,097  00 
93,020,513  00 

103,787,000  00 
61,317,833  00 


Exports  of  the  United  States  four 
years  next  preceding  the  long 
embargo,  viz. 

1804  $77,701,597 

1805  95,566,021 
1806,  as  above,      103,787,000 
1807                         108,343,558 


$385,398,176 


Note.... Thus  the  exports,  when 
commerce  was  free,  increased  near 
ly  6  fold  in  15  years,  and  under 
restrictions  diminished  about  one 
half  as  stated  below. 

Exports  of  the  United  States  four 
years  under  restrictions,  and 
one  year  in  war,  viz. 

1808  Domestick  Arts  $8,417,000 
Foreign       do.      12,997,414 

1809  Domestick  do.      28,841,000 
Foreign  do.  20,797,531 

1810  Domes.  &  For.    67,895,597 

1811  do.         do.      61,317,833 
1813  Domestick  Arts  25,008,152 

Foreign        do.       2,847,845 


$228,122,372 
2.  The  comparative  exports  of  each  State,  from  time  to  time,  viz. 


New-Hampshire, 

year  1791        year  1799 
$      142,858    $     360,039 

/ear  1806 
795,260  Dom.  Arts. 

year  1813 
$       29,996 

Massachusetts, 

2,445,975        11,421,591 

21,199,243 

do. 

1,807,926 

Vermont, 

20,480 

193,775 

do. 

.Rhode-Island, 

470,131         1,055,273 

2,091,835 

do. 

236,802 

Connecticut, 

710,340         1,143,818 

1,715,858 

do. 

974,303 

New-York, 

2,516,197       18,719,527 

21,762,845 

do. 

8,185,494 

New-Jersey, 

27,957                9,722 

33,867 

do. 

10,260 

Pennsylvania, 

2,931,624        12,431,967 

17,574,502 

do. 

3,577,117 

Delaware, 

119,840            297,065 

500,106 

do. 

133,432 

Maryland, 

2,193,355        16,299,609 

14,580,1505 

do. 

3,787,865 

Virginia, 

3,131,227         6,292,986 

5,055,396 

do. 

1,819,722 

North-  Carolina, 

524,548            485,921 

789,605 

do. 

797,318 

South-  Carolina, 

1,866,021         8,729,015 

9,743,782 

do. 

2,968,484 

Georgia, 

491,472          1,396,768. 

no  return. 

do. 

1,004,595 

"' 

Ohio, 

62,318 

do. 

Territories  of  the  U. 

S.    4,100,583 

do. 

Georgetown, 

254,353  ) 

Alexandria, 

991,793$ 

do. 

1,387,498 

Michigan, 

221,  2fO 

do. 

rsrew-OrleBB5, 

$,887,328 

do. 

1,045,153 

31 


3.  The  kind  of  exports  from  the  United   States,   as  articles  d& 
mestick  or  foreign  ;  productions  of  the  forest,  agriculture,  of  the  sea,  &c. 


Prod,  of  the  forest, 
of  the  sea, 
of  agriculture, 
of  manufact. 
Miscellaneous, 

Foreign  articles, 

Year  1804 
4,600,000 
3,420,000 
30,800,000 
2,100,000 
430,000 

Year  1805 
5,261,000 
2,884,000 
31,552,000 
2,525,000 
155,000 

Year  1806 
4,861,000 
3,116,000 
32,375,000 
2,707,000 
445,000 

Year  1807 
5,476,000 
2,804,009 
37,832,000 
2,120,000 
468,000 

41,440,000 
36,231,597 

42,377,000 
53,179,021 

43,504,000 
60,283,000 

48,700,000 
59,643,578 

77,671,597 

95,556,021  I  103,787,0001108,343,578- 

This  statement  shews,  that  about  three  fourths  of  the  domestick  exports 
of  the  United  States  are  the  produce  of  agriculture,  and  for  four  years 
prior  to  the  embargo,  exceeded  on  an  average  33  millions  a  year.  It 
will  readily  be  seen  what  great  losses  there' must  have  been  in  regard 
to  these  articles,  when  the  regular  exportation  of  them  has  been  capri 
ciously  interrupted  for  7  years  past,  by  embargoes,  restrictions  and 
war,  the  same  as  to  the  produce  of  the  forest,  and,  that  of  the  sea;  the 
latter  amounting,  on  an  average,  for  four  years  next  before  the  em 
bargo,  to  above  3  millions  of  dollar^  a  year,  has  been  by  restrictions 
and  war,  wholly  destroyed — And  the  shipping  employed  formerly,  in 
acquiring  these  productions  of  the  sea,  is  nearly  rotten  at  the  wharves, 
and  the  seamen  engaged  in  this  branch  of  business,  very  important,  in 
a  publick  view,  are  scattered  and  gone. 

The  domestick  articles  in  the  four  years  next  before  the  restrictive 
system,  were  50  millions  more  than  the  same  articles  exported  in  the 
four  years  under  it,  and  before  the  war. 


NOTE.— Page  8. 

Extract  from  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  November 

15,  1814. 

There  is  another  branch  of  the  service  which  appears  to  me  to  merit 
the  serious  deliberation  of  the  legislature,  with  regard  to  the  establishment 
of  some  regular  system,  by  which  the  voluntary  enlistments  for  the  navy 
may  derive  occasional  reinforcement  from  the  services  of  those  seamen, 
who,  pursuing  then-own  private  occupations,  are  exempt,  by  their  itine 
rant  habits,  from  publick  service  of  any  kind.  In  my  view  there  would 
be  nothing  incompatible  with  the  free  spirit  of  our  institutions,  or  with 
the  rights  of  individuals,  if  registers,  with  a  particular  descriptive  re 
cord,  were  kept  in  the  several  districts,  of  all  the  seamen  belonging  to 
the  United  States,  and  provision  made  by  law  for  classing  and  calling 
into  the  publick  service,  in  succession,  for  reasonable  stated  periods, 
such  portions  or  classes^  as  the  publick  service  might  require,  and  if  any 


individual,  so  called,  should  be  absent  at  the  time,  the  next  in  suc 
cession  should  perform  the  tour  of  duty  of  the  absentee,  who  should, 
on  his  return,  be  liable  to  serve  his  original  tour,  and  his  substitute  be 
exempt  from  his  succeeding  regular  tour  of  duty. 


NOTE. 

It  appears  from  the  following  extract  from  a  speech  of  Mr.  Madison, 
in  the  Debates  of  the  Virginia  Convention,  that  he  had  a  prophetick 
view  of  circumstances  which  would  induce  a  majority  of  States  to  SUP 
PORT  VIRGINIA  against  the  carrying  States.  See  also  the  speeches  of 
Mr.  Nicholas  in  that  Convention,  and  the  essays  in  the  Federalist, 
vritten  by  Mr.  Madison. 

Extract  from  debates  in  Virginia  Convention,— Richmond  Ed.  p.  224. 

I  will  not  sit  down  till  I  make  one  more  observation  on  what  fell 
from  my  honourable  friend.  He  says,  that  the  true  difference  between 
the  states  lies  in  this  circumstance — that  some  are  carrying  states,  and 
others  productive,  and  that  the  operation  of  the  new  government  will 
be,  that  there  will  be  a  plurality  of  the  former  to  combine  against  the 
interest  of  the  latter,  and  that  consequently  it  will  be  dangerous  to  put 
it  in  their  power  to  do  so.  I  would  join  with  him  in  sentiment,  if 
this  were  the  case.  Were  this  within  the  bounds  of  probability,  I 
should  be  equally  alarmed,  but  I  think  that  those  States  which  are 
contradistinguished  as  carrying  states,  from  the  non-importing  states, 
ivill  be  but  few.  I  suppose  the  southern  states  will  be  considered  by 
all,  as  under  the  latter  description.  Some  other  states  have  been 
mentioned  by  an  honourable  member  on  the  same  side,  which  are  not 
considered  as  carrying  states.  New-Jersey  and  Connecticut  can  by 
no  means  be  enumerated  among  the  carrying  states.  They  receive 
their  supplies  through  New-York.  Here  then  is  a  plurality  of  non- 
importing  states.  I  could  add  another  if  necessary.  Delaware,  though 
situated  upon  the  water,  is  upon  the  list  of  riou-carrying  states.  I 
might  say  that  a  great  part  of  New-Hampshire  is  so.  I  believe  a  ma 
jority  of  the  people  of  that  State  receive  their  supplies  from  Massachu 
setts,  Rhode-Island,  and  Connecticut. — Might  I  not  add  all  those  states 
which  will  be  admitted  hereafter  into  the  union  ?  These  will  be  non- 
carrying  states,  and  will  support  Virginia  in  case  the  carrying  states 
vyill  attempt  to  combine  against  the  rest. 


V 


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